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The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the PRC
The Abandonment-Entrapment Dynamic, the Balance of Threat and National Identity in the Trilateral Relationship
Vincent A. Pace
Enosinian Honors Senior Thesis Program
Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University
May 3, 2003
3. The Senkaku Islands Crisis
The Senkaku Islands (in Japanese) or the Diaoyutai Islands (in Chinese) are a small group of five islands (Uotsuri, Kita Kojima, Minami Kojima, Kuba and Taisho), three reefs and some above-water rocks that lie about 200 kilometers northwest of Taiwan and 400 kilometers west of Okinawa, measuring a mere 10km2 of land. The only current economic value of the islands is for fishing rights. But the potential for a much larger pay off is also present in suspected natural oil and gas in the seabed surrounding the islands, a possibility whose extent remains untested due to the competing claims between Japan and China (the PRC and Taiwan).
According to the International Boundaries Research Unit at the University of Durham, the dispute over to whom the islands belonged erupted after an 1968 UN study indicated that there could be massive amounts of natural gas and oil in the region when Taiwan voiced its opposition to Japanese sovereignty over the islands.36 The PRC chimed in several years later in September 1972.37 The PRC claims the Senkaku Islands as their own based on a mass of historical evidence dating back to the 13th century.38 From that time until Japan's imperial march West, the Chinese were the primary human visitors to the Senkaku Islands.
Japan asserts that the islands are part of the Ryukyu Islands, which Japan annexed in 1879 (and now form Okinawa Prefecture), and are therefore an integral part of Japan. Japan effectively controlled the islands from 1895, when it acquired Taiwan from the Qing Dynasty, until its defeat at the end of World War II. At that point, the US took control of the administration of the islands, incorporating them into the occupation administration of Okinawa and, after 1956, using them for military bombing exercises. When the US returned Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972, it also gave them administrative rights over the Senkaku Islands. Since the restoration of the islands to Japan, private citizens have owned four of them and the MOF owned the fifth. They have not been inhabited.
The official US position is to let the claimants resolve the issue among themselves. Before signing to Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971 that gave Japan administration of the Senkakus, the US State Department has issued a statement of "non-interference" that stated that although the US was giving the administration of the islands back to Japan, it would be up to Japan and the ROC to settle questions of sovereignty (the PRC had still not yet voiced its claim on the islands). The US to this day maintains this as their general position on the issue, despite Japanese efforts to get US support for their position.
Despite this position, the US has taken advantage of Japan's de facto control of the island for its own military use. Seeking to continue the air-to-ground bombing practice that they had used the islands for since 1956, the US leased the government-owned Taisho Island and the privately-owned Kuba Island (under the obscure code names of Kobi Island and Sekibi Island) following the reversion to Japanese control in 1972 for a period of 20 years and renewed this again in 1992 for another 20. Even though the leasing continues today, the US military last bombing exercises on the islands were in 1979.
The Senkaku Islands crisis refers primarily to a series of events in 1996 but the build up began years before. In 1978, a right-wing Japanese group built a lighthouse on one of the islands that would become a recurring focal point of tensions between Japan and China. During the 1980s, right-wing groups had partially restored the lighthouse. In 1990, another of these groups sought to finish the job. The MSDF issued a report that stated they would soon approve the authorization for a new lighthouse to be placed on the Senkaku Islands. The PRC hotly protested this move and the issue died down for the time being.
Tensions would flare again in February 1992, this time stoked by a PRC action. The PRC passed the Territorial Waters Law which reaffirmed its claims over the Senkaku Islands. The law stated that the disputed islands were part of PRC territory. It further stated that the PRC may forcibly remove foreign ships from its territorial waters and that any losses or damages resulting from such an intrusion would be the responsibilities of the intruding ship's home country. The protests unsurprisingly erupted from the Japanese side. "We regret your stating that the Senkaku Islands are part of Chinese territory," said Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada to PRC Ambassador Yang Zhenya in no unclear terms, "The Senkaku Islands are part of the Japanese territory which Japanese effectively governs."39
The next significant incidents occurred in 1995. In August, the PRC sent several Sukhoi 27 fighters towards the disputed islands. The Japanese ASDF immediately dispatched two Okinawa-based jets to intercept the PRC aircraft, which backed off. Later PRC vessels were spotted near the islands doing exploratory test for oil, including at least two instances of drilling.40 These surveys would continue throughout 1996 and 1997.
The most immediate spark of the 1996 crisis was, again, a right-wing Japanese group. On July 14, 1996, the JYF made a trip to the islands in which it built a 5-meter high aluminum lighthouse, raised the hinomaru, and made a monument for Japanese war dead on the privately owned island of Kita-Kojima. After Typhoon Herb damaged the lighthouse was damaged, the JYF returned again to repair it. After repairing the lighthouse, the JYF on September 10 submitted an application to the MSDF to consider making the lighthouse "official."
The PRC protested in a variety of ways in reaction to the actions of the JYF. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang accused the Japanese government of implicitly supporting "resurgent right-wing militarists" by permitting them to erect the lighthouse and plant a flag on the disputed islands. The PRC went down a familiar path by lambasting the Japanese claims regarding the islands in their domestic media with fiery rhetoric. An unsigned editorial in the People's Daily asserted: "Japan has thrown down the gauntlet on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. This is in no way an accident, but the inevitable appearance of Japan's domestic political right flaunting strength overseas."41 The newspaper stated that after China's "century of humiliation" the PRC remains supersensitive to questions of sovereignty and anyone giving into Japanese demands would find himself "cursed for all ages."42 They cancelled Vice Premier Li Lanqing's visit to Japan. Maj. Gen. Dai Yifang of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences told the China Daily in a front page interview: "A people's war will lead us to victory in high-tech conditions," implicitly threatening Japan.43 Yet in some ways, the PRC reaction was restrained here; even as protesters from Taiwan, Hong Kong and even the U.S. were manning boats to forcibly land on the Senkaku Islands, the PRC did not permit any of its of its citizens to do so.
The PRC also took provocative military steps. It sent two submarines to the islands following the erection of the lighthouse. The PRC Sing Tao newspaper reported that the islands were under surveillance by more than 10 PRC naval vessels and that the PLAAF has sent several planes over the islands.44 On September 30, the PLA held exercises to simulate the blockade, invasion and occupation of an island chain. On the side of restraint, however, the PRC did play down calls for a military response to the repeated landings by the JYF.
At first, the Japanese response to the PRC was cool; Ikeda responded that the Senkaku Islands are an inherent part of Japanese territory, only leading to stronger protests from the PRC. By fall, Japan had changed its tune and began to seek an end to a crisis that clearly was not leading to any resolution of the situation. On September 24, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda informed his PRC counterpart Qian Qichen that there were no plans to recognize the lighthouse as "official" and confirmed on October 10 that the government would not act on the JYF's application. In November, Ikeda expressed Japan's readiness to promote better relations with the PRC and Prime Minister Hashimoto stated: "We believe we must prevent our important relations from being poisoned over this problem."45
Throughout the crisis, the US reiterated its position of supporting "no nation" regarding the territorial row over the Senkaku Islands while urging a peaceful resolution. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said: "We do not recognize any particular country's sovereignty" and urged that the various claimants settle their disputes "in an orderly and peaceful and stable manner."46 State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said: "From the U.S. standpoint, though we understand it has a great emotional content, it's not the kind of issue that's worth elevating beyond a war of words. ... We expect that the claimants to the islands will resolve their differences and do so peacefully and we urge all the claimants to exercise restraint as they move forward in this process."47 Burns went on to say that Washington had no intention of serving as a mediator and called for direct negotiations among the claimants.
After the peak of the crisis was passed, the US finally indicated that the US-Japan Security Treaty would cover a conflict over the Senkaku Islands. State Department Assistant Secretary for Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said: "The United States has a very strong commitment to Japan under Article V of the security treaty. We abide by that commitment and its terms, requiring the United States to support Japan and its territories, are very clear."48 Campbell avoided making a statement supporting Japanese sovereignty over the Senkakus, distinguishing that with "an area under Japanese administration."49 William Breer, a former U.S. Minister in Japan, broke out of diplospeak and stated simply that the U.S. would have in all likelihood responded to a Japanese call for security support had hostilities broken out.50
Japan did little to try to bring the US into the conflict on their side as the US had already repeatedly stated its position. However, a right-wing Japanese media outlet did pick up on the contradiction between the US' neutral stance and its military use of the Senkaku Islands: "The United States is liable to state a clear view on this contradiction as long as it maintains the right of using the firing ranges."51 On the diplomatic front, Japan asked the US to reassure the PRC that the US-Japan security relationship does not target the PRC in response to a series of PRC media reports accusing Japan of a resurgent militarism with US support to contain the PRC. In this relatively minor aid, the US came through for Japan.
The issue settled down until the following May when Shingo Nishimura, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives' opposition New Frontier Party, led a 4-member group to the Senkaku Island of Uotsuri in order to "inspect part of Japanese territory."52 Not surprisingly, this was denounced by the PRC as a serious violation of PRC sovereignty. Even an anonymous U.S. administration official reacted negatively towards this action, calling it "provocative" and saying: "'we certainly don't advocate any party taking action that serves to increase tension regarding this issue."53
With tensions ratcheting up once again, the PRC called for a shelving of the issue. On July 14, 1997, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Xu Dunxin said: "It is better for the issue to be solved over a long period of time."54 Shortly thereafter, in early September, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto made a visit to the PRC which downplayed the past tensions over the Senkaku Islands, saying: "Neighbors tend to have trouble as they have close relations."55 The same day Hashimoto made those remarks the MSDF prevented another landing by a right-wing politician on the islands, the first time it had prohibited Japanese nationals from doing so.
After this point, the Senkaku issue faded in importance although it continued to rear its head from time to time. Both Japan and the PRC continued to assert their sovereignty over the islands. Japan continued to fend off the boats filled with people from Taiwan and Hong Kong from visiting the islands and the PRC continued to keep its citizens from participating. The JYF sought to make a visit to the islands to fix their lighthouse once again in 1999 and the typical protests where issued by the PRC. In 2000, the LDP included Senkaku sovereignty as part of their party platform to the expected PRC protests. In 2001, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford indicated more strongly than the previous administration that the US would support Japan in a conflict over the Senkakus with the PRC, saying: "'Anytime Japan is involved in conflict of whatever sort, the United States will be seriously concerned and involved to one degree or other."56
Ships from the PRC at a regular pace entered waters sensitive to the Japanese and this precipitated repetitive diplomatic flurries. In reaction to this, Japan and the PRC negotiated a "confidence-building" agreement in February 2001. This agreement stated that each side would notify the other "if either country is to conduct maritime scientific research nearby the coast of the other, except for territorial waters."57 According to Japanese Foreign Ministry officials, "nearby the coast of the other" was understood to mean a theoretical median line. By that measure, the PRC has broken this agreement several times since it was implementation but it nevertheless represents an improvement in the pre-agreement situation.
Most recently, and in a sign of the Japanese government's desire to shore up its claim for sovereignty of the islands, the MPMHAPT in April 2002 began leasing the three islands not already leased by the U.S. (Uotsuri, Kita-Kojima, and Minami-Kojima) from their private owner. One government source was quoted as saying that the lease "will show our firm stand that the Senkaku islands are historical Japanese territory."59 The PRC's reaction was predictable - they condemned the action - as was Japan's reaction - they brushed it off by asserting their sovereignty over the islands.
The Senkaku Islands issue is one that lights the hottest of nationalist fires on both sides of the conflict. Similar to the Taiwan issue, it is one that seems likely to maintain a certain level of tensions and provoking occasional crises due to the intractable positions on both sides. It is fairly certain that no resolution is likely anytime soon.
This issue clearly shows the concessions the ruling elite are willing to give in order to keep the right-wing groups' consent for their rule. Surely, Japan could have devised any number of means to keep people off the islands and thereby greatly reduce tensions with the PRC. But it elected not to. This suggests that the ruling LDP was seeking to appease the right, and taken in conjunction with Yasukuni Shrine visits and white washed textbooks, this seems to be a reasonable conclusion. This pandering to the right has the potential to bring this issue to the foreground until a final resolution is reached.
The PRC showed an aggressive face in the use of their military forces. The timing of its most aggressive actions is important to note: it was just two months after the Taiwan Straits crisis. After this point, the use of extremely provocative military actions on the part of the PRC tapered off. This suggests that over time the leadership of the PRC slowly began to reject aggressive military tactics as the most efficient way to achieve the national interest. In this case, the increasing tensions with Japan would not lead to any constructive end; any battle would have likely been lost and would have brought them into conflict with the US, with broad and negative repercussions.
Here too both Japan and the PRC showed restraint. The PRC did not permit boatloads of activist citizens to make attempts to land on the Senkaku Islands, as did Taiwan and pre-reunification Hong Kong. Again the PRC ignored calls for more aggressive military retaliation that seems to emerge in every crisis. Finally, each side decided at a certain point that enough was enough and it was time to reshelf the issue, as no practical solution was in sight.
The PRC seems to be taking a "wait and dominate" approach to the Senkaku Issue. With trends in power capabilities, the longer the two wait to resolve this issue the greater the leverage of the PRC will become. Thus instead of forcing an abortive and damaging confrontation, the PRC bides its time and shows restraint for the time being, even while also revealing that it has a tendency to provocatively uses its military in confrontations. Even while showing restraint, the PRC gives hints to its actual position by the continuing surveying of the sea for natural resources.
Yet the most striking behavior regarding the Senkaku Islands is that of the US. The US insists on neutrality, even while ultimately confirming under both a Democratic and a Republican administration that it will stand behind Japan if hostilities break out. The implication is that the US is willing to tolerate a certain level of tension between PRC and Japan and the line is drawn at the point where the US-Japan Security Treaty comes into effect. It seems that if the US does not perceive its direct interest as being involved, it does not make moves to get its hands dirty. This is in contrast to the EP-3E incident when Japan's national interests were at little risk but it stuck out its neck any way to stand beside the US. This is consistent with the predictions based on Snyder's concept of asymmetries of the levels of interdependence; the lesser power makes strong moves to reassure the greater of its value while the greater simply does not.
The twist in all of this is that the US is not just an unrelated third party. Its military leases on two of the islands make it an interested player. That lease is in itself an interesting issue. It seems more than just a little odd that the US is has been leasing islands since 1972 and will be at least until 2012 for bombing exercises even though it states that no exercises have been conducted since 1979. It is hard to swallow that any military would simply lease empty space for an activity that has not been done for over two decades. The implication is that there is another motivation in US actions here. One can undoubtedly speculate to no end about what interests the US has here, but the long-term commitment to lease these islands belies that there is one.
If it is in the US interests to maintain access to these islands, why does it not push Japan's case for sovereignty over the islands? The obvious reason is the negative impact this would have on relationship with the PRC, not to mention Taiwan. Such a unilateral push to resolve the island issue would be a temporary solution at best and it would provoke higher tensions between the PRC on one hand and Japan and the US on the other. Thus, the US benefits from the status quo; much like with Taiwan, keeping the sovereignty status of the Senkaku Islands in limbo lets the US continue to reap military benefits while not having to deal with a contentious resolution.
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Table of Contents | 1. Introduction: Theory and Methodology | 2. The Taiwan Strait Crisis | 3. The Senkaku Islands Crisis | 4. The EP-3E Incident | 5. The War on Terrorism | 6. The PRC in the US-Japan Relationship
List of Acronyms | Bibliography
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