The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the PRC

The Abandonment-Entrapment Dynamic, the Balance of Threat and National Identity in the Trilateral Relationship

Vincent A. Pace

Enosinian Honors Senior Thesis Program

Elliott School of International Affairs

George Washington University

May 3, 2003

6. The PRC in the US-Japan Relationship

The PRC national identity that uses aggressive force domestically to ensure that the elites remains in power is clearly exported in its foreign policy. Both the Taiwan Straits crisis and the Senkaku Islands crisis of 1996 display strong and provocative uses of the military force, as does the EP-3E incident in 2001. This is further supported by the fervent cries for military retaliation beyond what the PRC has so far done by various actors within the PRC, which have thus far been ignored largely due to capability issues.

At the same time, however, the PRC has modified the degree that the PRC exports its aggressive use of force through foreign policy. In 1996, the PRC fired missiles, conducted massive exercises, played cat and mouse with Japanese fighters, and was generally aggressive with the use of its armed forces. By 2001, this was reigned in considerably. The aggressiveness of the intercepts of the EP-3E and other reconnaissance planes however shows that provocative behavior remained latent. Nevertheless, the fact that the largest military conflict with the PRC in recent years was limited to small-scale interceptions along the PRC borders possibly caused by decisions on the parts of individual pilots, rather than larger-scale actions aimed at territories not administered by the PRC and definitely sent down the chain of command, suggests that the PRC leadership reigned in the use of provocative military actions.

This reason for this change is largely that aggressive military behavior failed as a means to forward the PRC's national interest. First, the actions in the Taiwan Straits crisis failed in their immediate goal; threatening PRC actions did not hinder Lee Teng-hui from getting elected and many suggested that they actually helped him. Second, the aggressive actions increased the threat perceived by Japan and the US. This encouraged them to tighten security relations even further, something the PRC has long perceived as against its national interests. In sum, these actions brought no significant gains to the PRC but did bring significant losses and they have thus lost favor as a policy tool.

Another export of PRC identity is its fiery rhetoric and threats, implicit or explicit. PRC elites use fear of the use of force as an important tool in governing and this tactic is exported to Japan and the US in the trilateral security relationship. These too, in tandem with provocative military actions, have declined over the course of the case study. Implicit nuclear threats to the US and the "sea of fire" were not prominent in the EP-3E incident, despite strongly indignant rhetoric.

Throughout the period covered in the case studies, PRC rhetoric of opposing a "hegemonic" US and a "militaristic" or "imperialistic" Japan is a constant. This is a product of the national identity fostered in the PRC by the ruling elites of the CCP. This identity has its historic root in opposition to the humiliation of China under imperialist rulers, most notably Japan. The US, although not a major imperial power in China, still is portrayed as part of the Western imperialist club and can thereby play into the oppositional identity of the PRC. As a concession to those the CCP rules over, it assures them that it is not allowing the PRC to get humiliated and that it continues to stand in opposition to the "imperial" powers. The CCP actively encourages this perception and then uses it to enhance their own legitimacy when an opportunity presents itself. For Japan and the US, the ultimate effect of this is to lower their perception of trustworthiness of the PRC and thereby encourage the perception of threat.

There are also important trends in the actions that these states took in reaction to the actions they observed from the others. We have already seen that the use of military actions diminished the intensity due to the PRC moving away from provocative use of its armed forces. Economic actions were virtually nonexistent as reactions to these security issues. This was largely due to the US delinking of economic issues from other issues with the PRC. The motivation for this was primarily that economic sanctions would hurt both the PRC and the US and thus other methods of pursuing political and military interests should be sought. Thus, political actions are ascendant in the trilateral relationship, reducing significantly the threat of hot conflict as well as tensions in general.

Behavior within the US-Japan Security Alliance regarding the PRC is consistent with Snyder's abandonment-entrapment dynamic. In March of this year, LDP policy chief Taro Aso, regarding Japanese cooperation with the US on Iraq, stated: "In terms of priority, we have to weigh heavily on the Japan-U.S. security treaty concerning the security of Japan ... as the United Nations will not protect us. If we have to protect Japan by force, the Japan-U.S. security treaty will be a very important factor."¹¹⁴ This strongly belies the fear that Japan, as the lesser power, could be abandoned by the US should the US perceive it as irrelevant and is reflected clearly in the two cases studies of US-PRC conflict. The Japanese reaction to the Taiwan Straits crisis revealed some of Japan's concerns about entrapment yet their actions suggest they were prepared to show that they were not irrelevant in the security relationship had hostilities broken out. The EP-3E crisis provided a less ambiguous displaying of Japanese support, again suggesting that Japan.

The US also expressed its unease about entrapment in the Senkaku Islands crisis by reacting negatively to some Japanese actions as well as by urging the sides to resolve the issue peacefully. The neutral US position on the sovereignty issue has been easier for it to hold due to its power dominance over Japan; the US has little fear of being deemed irrelevant and thus abandoned by the Japanese as long as a threat like the PRC exists. Especially revealing here is the differences in the US reaction to the Senkaku Islands crisis and the Japanese reaction to the EP-3E incident. Both sides were essentially third parties with no strong interests at stake, yet Japan backed the US strongly during the EP-3E incident while the US refused to back Japan's position at all. This suggests that the US will keep out of sticky PRC-Japan security issues that do not endanger US security concerns.

Finally, Japan has made strong moves to stand beside the US in a meaningful way during the war on terrorism. This was especially important since the PRC's cooperation was raising the fear of abandonment by making the PRC a US ally in this war. In contrast to the PRC, the war on terrorism affects Japan only indirectly and thus it is not so clearly in Japan's national interests to take a prominent role. Yet the Japanese reaction to the US call for assistance went farther than that of the PRC. This not only reflects capabilities but also Japan's fear of abandonment as the US had increased security convergence with the PRC thanks to the war on terrorism.

The Japanese moved from support with caveats in the Taiwan Straits crisis to outright support in the EP-3E incident and even more proactive support in the war on terrorism. This suggests that between 1996 and 2001 Japan reached the consensus, reflected above in Aso's comment, to more resolutely support the US, and is further supported by other factors such as the strengthened Guidelines and joint missile defense development. The key factor in this move was the increased Japanese perception of a threat from the PRC in the wake of the PRC's aggressive military behavior in 1996. This encouraged the Japanese to seek greater protections from the rising capabilities of an aggressive PRC, for which it turned to the US.

The US actions can all be based on a policy of deterring the actual outbreak of hostilities in the trilateral relationship. US moves in the Taiwan Straits crisis were directly aimed at that end. That has also been the US goal in the Senkaku issue: paralleling Taiwan, the US standing behind Japan strongly discourages hostilities from the PRC. Even the surveillance that led to the EP-3E incident is part of this cycle, as the US seeks to maintain a balance in the Taiwan Strait so the PRC will not be tempted use military force against Taiwan.

In the long-term of the trilateral relationship, the worst-case scenario for Japan is US-PRC security collusion that does not include or, worse yet, targets Japan. Thus, given any security cooperation between the US and the PRC, Japan will act strongly to show that its security cooperation in the security alliance is more valuable to the US than that of the PRC.

In the same way, long-term US security goals in the region would be hurt most by PRC-Japan security cooperation excluding or targeting the US. However, the observation that PRC-Japanese security cooperation of major relevance is a null set gives the US an advantage, at least in the short to medium terms. Due to historical mistrust that centers specifically on security issues, the PRC and Japan will for the foreseeable future remain unlikely to cooperate in security matters. Thus the US has little need to fear abandonment in favor of the PRC.

By this measure, the PRC is facing its worst-case scenario of US-Japanese collusion against the PRC. The PRC will continue reacting hostilely to perceived enhancements of the US-Japanese security arrangements and will seek to drive a wedge into the relationship. However, as long as there is a strong perception in both the US and Japan that the PRC is a threat and the other member of the alliance can help them reduce it, the PRC will have only limited success in prying the US and Japan apart.

This threat perception is based in identity factors that, for now, are playing to keep Japan and the US strongly aligned against the PRC. Barring the unlikely scenarios that Japan or the US import PRC identity, the change that could totally revamp this identity structure would be the emergence of democracy in the PRC. It was Deng Xiaoping himself who suggested that there could be general elections in the PRC in the 21st century, and many in the West continue to speculate over when democracy will finally sweep through the PRC. If the PRC were to change to the extent that, say, Taiwan has, identity differences between the US, Japan and the PRC would be immensely reduced, engendering a greater trust between all three actors and making the threat level between the three nations similar and low. Although such an altered PRC-Japan-US security relationship would parallel the USSR-PRC-US relationship with similar levels of trust, they key is that in this case those levels would be low. Most likely, as the PRC's identity gets closer to the US and Japan, it will become better incorporated into the security framework, similar to the way Russia has with NATO after the collapse of the USSR.

A second issue that is already in flux and that has the potential to affect the trilateral relationship over the long term is the relative power capabilities of the three sides. Specifically, the relative power capabilities of the PRC are rising vis-à-vis the US and Japan. Holding all else constant, the more these abilities increase, the more weight the US and Japan will place in the security relationship. At the same time, by raising the stakes, the fear of entrapment will also continue to rise. If the PRC ever gets to a point where its power capabilities significantly exceed that of the US and Japan combined and it has the will to use these capabilities - in other words, the PRC becomes dominant in the region - it could very well play on this fear of entrapment to drive a wedge into the US-Japan security relationship. However, as this assumes no identity change, the PRC is unlikely to completely break the relationship or effectively co-opt one of the other players against the third due to identity differences that place the PRC in opposition to the others.

The most likely scenario seems to be that the identity of the PRC is changing gradually in ways that cause identity convergence even as its power continues to rise. The rising power of the PRC seems to be encouraging the US and Japan to tighten the security bonds between them and this looks set to continue into the foreseeable future. Moreover, this rise in relative power seems to be outstripping the kinds of identity changes - namely political reform - that could truly raise the trust and diminish threat perceptions in the trilateral security relationship. Nevertheless, the PRC's moves away from aggressive use of its armed forces as well as its reduction of the most outrageous rhetoric indicates some of the possible creeping evolutionary changes that may be in store for the PRC national identity. The PRC's economic identity has converged rapidly with Japan and the US in the post-Mao era. This has strongly limited the level to which these nations are willing to let tensions rise and is very likely at least partially responsible for the PRC's relaxation of tension-increasing activities over the course of these case studies. One can hope that the whole of PRC national identity will also converge rapidly and further limit the possible range of tensions. Yet The PRC, the US and Japan will continue to behave with restraint in the trilateral security relationship in the short to medium term despite the crises, while the long-term situation will depend ultimately on the respective speeds of the PRC's identity change and their relative capability growth.

"Japan should back U.S. even without new U.N. vote: Aso." Japan Economic Newswire. March 1, 2003.