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The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the PRC
The Abandonment-Entrapment Dynamic, the Balance of Threat and National Identity in the Trilateral Relationship
Vincent A. Pace
Enosinian Honors Senior Thesis Program
Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University
May 3, 2003
5. The War on Terrorism
PRC President Jiang Zemin watched the September 11 attacks unfold on CNN and immediately ordered his government to issue condolences to the US and offer full cooperation with the US to track down those responsible for the attacks. Jiang used the emergency hotline between Beijing and the White House to contact Bush, reportedly being the second leader to get through after Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Xinhua, Jiang reiterated the condolences and the offer of cooperation, saying: "China is ready to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the US and the international community in combating all manner of terrorist violence."80
Following these broad yet vague declarations of PRC support, details of what PRC cooperation would entail gradually began to emerge. PRC Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said that the PRC would share intelligence that could be helpful to the war on terrorism. The PRC also said that aid in the war against terrorism would not be linked to any other issues. On the other hand, various PRC officials made clear the link to the war on terrorism with their conflict against Muslim separatists in Western Xinjiang, none more clearly than a statement by Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi: "We hope that efforts to fight against East Turkistan terrorist forces should become part of the international effort, and should also win support and understanding."81
Even with a new tone of cooperation between the US and the PRC thanks the war on terrorism, issues that were traditionally part and parcel of PRC foreign policy continued to reverberate if official announcements, including anti-hegemonism and abiding by the principles of the UN. PRC Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou warned: "Counter-terrorism should not be to used to practice hegemony."82 Tang Jiaxuan said that the anti-terrorism campaign should "respect the United Nations charter and norms of international law."83 Sun Yuxi expanded on that, saying: "I want to emphasize that on the question against terrorism, China's position is clear cut. We have always held that the relevant measures against terrorism should be well-targeted, concrete evidence and based on the charter and principles of the United Nations."84
The US' diplomatic efforts were aimed to get as many allies as possible, and the thrust for the PRC's assistance was strong despite the administrations previous tensions with the PRC. Colin Powell noted that the PRC could be helpful in Central Asia because "it has influence in that region. It has knowledge and information. It has intelligence that might be of help to us."85 This statement closely mirrored the core of Beijing's offer to Washington. As Beijing had long been hoping, Bush also finally moved away from the "strategic competitor" label for the PRC and made the functioning rhetoric a "cooperative, constructive, and candid" relationship. And in a relationship that often relies on summit diplomacy to smooth over tensions, Jiang was very pleased that Bush went to the APEC meeting in Shanghai despite ongoing military activities in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, various administration officials made clear that there would be no trade-off for PRC cooperation in the war on terrorism for benefits in other aspects of the relationship. The two issues that appeared to be at the crux of these statements were Taiwan and criticism of the PRC's human rights record. There was much speculation on Taiwan that they might be traded for PRC assistance in the war on terrorism to which at least in part prompted an administration response. And with the PRC's linking of East Turkistan separatists to the war on terrorism, many were concerned that the US would turn a blind eye to the PRC's treatment of the Uighur minority group from where these separatists came.
The PRC came through on its offer of complete support in a variety of concrete ways on the diplomatic and humanitarian fronts. It assisted in the drafting and passing of two key resolutions in the UN Security Council and General Assembly. Its vote on Resolution 1368 marked the first time that Beijing supported a US-led military intervention since the end of the Cold War, opting to vote for the resolution rather than its typical practice of abstaining. The PRC also used its diplomatic influence on Pakistan to help bring that country on board the anti-terrorism bandwagon, despite years of support for the Taliban. Despite declarations by PRC officials that the APEC meeting would not be "hijacked" by the war on terrorism, its priority in the agenda of the meetings was not protested by the PRC and APEC issued its first-ever major political statement. On the humanitarian front, the PRC offered aid for Afghan refugee resettlement in Pakistan and $150 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan.86
The PRC's cooperation also covered a wide range military and security issues. As US request and PRC statements indicated, the most widely known form of cooperation was their sharing of intelligence on Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The PRC quickly secured the remote mountain borders with Afghanistan and then Pakistan with rapid-response units. The PRC granted approval for a US aircraft carrier battle group, on its way to the Arabian Sea, to make a port call in Hong Kong. It participated in the moves to cut off terrorists from funds, searching accounts in both the PRC and Hong Kong for terrorist links. The PRC worked with the US to establish a practical working relationship on counterterrorism, including permitting the FBI to open an office in Beijing to help coordinate anti-terrorist activities between the two capitals. The PRC signed on to the Declaration of Principles on Enhanced Security Cooperation, a US-led initiative to ensure safe maritime trade. In what some viewed as a quid pro quo for putting the East Turkistan Islamic Movement on the US list of terroristic organizations, Beijing promised to address missile technology proliferation.
It is also important to note some of the things the PRC did not do. On the positive side for the PRC-US relationship, there was little of the typical rhetoric when the US placed its troops in countries bordering the PRC. "If the US military presence is genuinely for the purpose of anti-terrorism, and favorable for the prevention of chaos in Afghanistan after the war, China can understand," said Beijing University International Relations Institute chief Zhu Feng.87
But most of what the PRC could have done but did not would have benefited the PRC-US relationship. The PRC, citing sensitivities over sovereignty, did not grant overflight or basing rights to the US, making it and Iran the only two countries on Afghanistan's border to do so. The PRC declined to commit any military units as part of the UN forces on the ground in Afghanistan. Despite its pledges of monetary aid, and in contrast to the role the PRC played in East Timor, the PRC also declined to help with training the new Afghan army or police forces, as well as declining to send engineers, construction workers, or equipment to help in the reconstruction.
The US reaction to PRC assistance in the war on terrorism needless to say was positive but had caveats. In a notable rhetorical departure, Bush praised PRC cooperation, saying: "President Jiang and the government stand side by side with the American people as we fight this evil force."88 But, in an obvious reference to the PRC's Uighur minority, Bush said the war on terrorism "must never be an excuse to persecute minorities."89 Nevertheless, nearly a year after the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration greatly pleased the PRC when it put the East Turkistan Islamic Movement on its list of terroristic organizations, even while continuing to stress to the PRC the need to "treat the Uighur minority with respect and with dignity."90
Like Jiang, Koizumi did not take long in offering Japan's full cooperation. In contrast to the foot-dragging in organizing Japanese support for the first Gulf War, Koizumi promised swift enactment of a law that would permit Japanese assistance in the war against terrorism, allowing a much broader role for the Japanese military than in the past. The law he supported would provide non-combat rear area logistical support to the US war on terrorism and was most controversial in that it would allow the deployment of troops overseas for something other than a UN peacekeeping mission.
In comparison to the PRC's loud opposition to the 1996 strengthening of the US-Japan security relationship, the PRC's reaction to US-Japanese cooperation in the war on terrorism and the changes required to bring about that cooperation were muted. Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said: "For historical reasons, it is quite obvious a military role by the Japanese government would be a sensitive issue. It should be dealt with in a prudent manner."91 Professor Liang Yingming, a Beijing University scholar, said: "China is not opposed to Japanese support for the US. In principle, it would not be fair to dictate how Japan can help in the fight against terrorists. But as a victim of Japanese military aggression in World War II, China is justifiably wary."92 Some PRC sources demanded that Japan make a public statement disavowing any intention to strengthen its military in its aid to the US. But Professor Liang shrewdly noted: "What can Japan say that will banish anyone's suspicions?"93
Nevertheless, on October 8, the day the US began its bombing campaign in Afghanistan, Japan began an explanation of its military activities to the PRC at the highest level. Prime Minister Koizumi traveled to Beijing for a quick one-day visit to meet with top PRC leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji where one of the main issues on the table was Japanese cooperation in the war on terrorism. Jiang Zemin said it was "easy to understand" Japan's desire to assist the US.94 Nevertheless, the PRC voiced concern as well and urged caution. Zhu Rongji, repeating the earlier sentiments expressed by Zhu Bangzao, told Koizumi: "I want Japan to be careful about expanding the SDF's role."95 Koizumi moved to assure the PRC that the new legislation that would permit enhanced military cooperation would not lead to Japanese troops moving to conquer foreign lands, telling Zhu Rongji: "We are discussing how to take on international terrorism and have already decided that we will not use force because we regret that the Japanese military victimized many people in the past."96 He even went so far as to say: "I want to make the Japan-China relationship stronger - on par with the Japan-US alliance."97
Having assured support to the US and attempted to placate the PRC's worries, Koizumi's policy still had to overcome significant domestic opposition. The Japanese postwar constitution rejects force as a means of settling international disputes and restricts the military to self-defense, which was traditionally interpreted in such a way that Japanese troops rarely went abroad. Koizumi used a variety of methods to speak in favor of his policy choice. He directly appealed to the constitution by implying that the war against terrorism was in Japan's self-defense as well: "The acts of terrorism on the US are a grave challenge to the freedom and peace not only of the US but also of the international community."98 He also argued that the close relationship with the US made Japan's support necessary. He emphasized that it would be within the existing constitutional framework and subject to the parliamentary control.
Koizumi was successful in getting his Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law through the lower house just before the APEC summit in Shanghai and, in the upper house, with little power to halt legislation, it passed shortly thereafter. The legislation enabled Japan to sends its military overseas to transport weapons and other supplies for the war on terrorism, as well as to provide logistical and humanitarian support. It limited Japanese troops to areas where combat was not taking place, even while loosening the restrictions on carrying and using weapons. It would have a sunset of two years, at which point the Diet would be able to renew it or let it expire. Plans for Japan's involvement emerging at this time called for up to 1,000 personnel, two fuel-supply ships and three or four destroyers for logistical support on Diego Garcia.99 Inner-LDP opposition had succeed in keeping Aegis-equipped destroyers out of the plans up to this point, believing sending them would be seen as overly aggressive.100
The PRC reaction to this legislation broke completely with precedent and welcomed the legislation but nevertheless called for prudence on Japan's part. In response to the passing of the Japanese law, Sun Yuxi, a spokesman for the PRC Foreign Ministry, said: "We believe that cracking down on terrorism is a common task of the international community. We hope that the relevant parties will, in accordance with the UN Charter and international law, make efforts in the fight against terrorism."101 This essentially gave the PRC's blessing to Japan's activities to support the US war on terrorism. However, he continued to urge caution, saying: "Due to historical reasons, the role of Japan in the military field is a question that should be handled with caution by the Japanese government."102 He also stressed that Japan's role should be a non-combat role, saying that all activities "should be adopted in consideration of history, in consideration of the Asian people and in consideration of the demands and feelings of the Japanese people who much love the cause of peace."
Even while the diplomatic tone was cautiously supportive, some outlets of the state-controlled media of the PRC continued to warn of a threat and gradually moved back to the more traditional PRC stance. The official China Daily expressed concern that any further solidification of the US-Japan security alliance would be "a threat to security in East Asia."103 In a January 11, 2002, article entitled "Japan's new defense plans alarming," the China Daily accused Japan of intending to be a military superpower, saying: "With changes in international circumstances and the Asia-Pacific security environment in the past few years, Japan quickened the pace on its path to becoming a political and military giant."104
The Japanese support under the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law began in less than 10 days after the law came into effect. The Japanese dispatched six MSDF vessels: three destroyers, two supply ships and a minesweeper. The ships - including the 8,150-ton Hamada and the 8,100-ton Towada - were used to procure fuel in Singapore, Bahrain, Australia and elsewhere and supply it to US ships, a request strongly pressed for by Washington. The 5,700-ton minesweeper, in addition to availability for its namesake use, carried about 200 tons of tents and other goods to the port in Karachi, Pakistan, to be given to refugees. The SDF supplied six C-130 transport planes and other aircraft that linked US bases in Japan with those in Guam, Singapore, and elsewhere, carrying goods and personnel. The SDF supplied transportation for goods between US bases within Japan.105 The cabinet later added an additional destroyer and a landing ship to transport construction equipment along with a 140-member Thai army engineering battalion.106 Early in 2003, after an intense domestic debate over the legality, the Aegis-class destroyer Kirishima left the Japanese port of Yokosuka bound for the Indian Ocean to replace one of the destroyers escorting support ships that were refueling coalition ships involved in Afghanistan.
The diplomatic support the Japanese provided was unflinching, even if they were not in the same positions of influence as the PRC in terms of the UNSC and geography. Koizumi declared: "The government of Japan is firmly resolved to strive for the eradication of terrorism. At the same time, Japan strongly supports the United States and is determined to do its utmost to offer assistance and cooperation."107 Japan continuously supported the US rhetorically as well as through its activities in organization such as the UN and APEC. They voiced solidarity with the US at a number of summit meetings and through various officials at lower levels. Japan also sought and succeeded in hosting the international conference for reconstruction aid in Afghanistan.
As with the PRC, the US administration was strongly pleased with Japan's reaction to the US call for assistance. In a trip to Japan, Bush said: "Your response to the terrorist threat has demonstrated the strength of our alliance, and the indispensable role of Japan - a role that is global, and begins in Asia."108 This line continued unabashed and untainted by the caveats found in the praise of the PRC's cooperation in the war on terrorism.
The PRC's support of the US was strong and unambiguous when placed in the context of the post-Tiananmen relationship. This was a reaction that was strongly anchored in the national interests of the PRC in two fundamental ways. Most obviously, the PRC has its own security worries from Islamic terrorists supported by the network of international terrorism that the US war against terrorism is aimed at. Previous PRC carrot and stick efforts to end collaboration between extremists in Afghanistan and Xinjiang had been to no avail. Moreover, this undoubtedly extends to the general border security in Western Xinjiang and along the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan.
But behind the scenes was the ever-present importance of the PRC-US relationship, easily given more weight by the PRC than any other single bilateral relationship. After September 11, it was a no-brainer that the US was about to lash out aggressively at the culprits of the attacks. For the PRC, their typical opposition to foreign military intervention became untenable due to the nature of the attacks and the strong reaction they provoked from the US administration; such a position would have been an immense and unnecessary drag on PRC-US relations and it was clear that such opposition would not be easily shook off in the wake of September 11.
The PRC still had to deal with the strong anti-American domestic settlement. Being in the PRC on September 11 and for months afterwards, it was not difficult to find citizens who contributed to the strong undercurrent of opinion that thought the US got what it deserved. Moreover, almost any visitor to the PRC can cite some PRC citizen's criticism of Jiang Zemin. One person I spoke to criticized Jiang Zemin for not striking back at the US after the bombing of the embassy in Belgrade, which he was sure was intentional.
Opinions like this molded the PRC reaction to September 11. They guaranteed some level of typical PRC rhetoric. Anti-hegemony was a common theme in PRC statements, where the post-USSR meaning of hegemony is understood to be US dominance. The PRC was adamant in wanting the US to conduct the war on terrorism via the UN, where the PRC's voice could be heard and where it would be easier to claim that the US-led war on terrorism was not a unilateral hegemonist action but rather something sanctioned by the UN. The PRC was also setting the groundwork to stand against future questionable expansions of the war on terrorism. With a US administration that was taking a very critical look at Iraq, this was likely in the PRC's thoughts as they emphasized that the war on terrorism should be clearly linked to terrorist activities and done through the UN.
Domestic opinion was also likely also a factor in the limits on PRC military cooperation. However, this cannot fully explain the decision since it would be easy enough for the PRC to grant something like overflight rights to the US and simply censor the media so the public never finds out. Thus, we need to seek opposition to these actions elsewhere. The group that likely opposed this was in the leadership and it is not a big assumption to think that this was the influence of the conservative element of which the military is a huge part.
Yet at the same time it is noteworthy that there was no outcry at the emergence of US troops in nations bordering the PRC. This represented the silencing of the conservative military element in the PRC, which in previous nearby US interventions such as Korea and Vietnam encouraged a vitriolic reaction from the PRC. Elements of the same group helped produce the reactions against military interventions in sovereign nations such as Kosovo on the fear that they could set a precedent for such intervention against the PRC. Yet this time, even though there was concern in the PRC about the US military build-up in the nations along its western border and the loss of PRC influence in these nations, the response was muted.
Bringing Japan into the picture, one sees complex actions considering both sides in the trilateral relationship on the part of Japan and the PRC. First, Japan needed to outdo the PRC in cooperation. Failing to do so would lead to questions of the benefits of the security treaty with Japan when a so-called "strategic competitor" was providing more cooperation. Second, even while seeking to back the US strongly, Japan sought to placate the PRC. It did not want the PRC to see its activities as hostile.
The PRC, for its part, seemed to have been considering the US reaction when it reacted mildly to the expansion of the role of the Japanese MSDF. One can imagine that if there were no attacks on September 11 and Japan suddenly sent its ships to the Indian Ocean the PRC's reaction would have been full of the typical rhetoric. The PRC's restrained reaction makes sense if we consider it's approach to the US; it did not want to be seen as impeding the US war on terrorism, and hostile opposition to Japanese military activities might have produced just such a result.
As in the past, the PRC-US relationship is at its best when there is a shared issue of national security. The US, for its part, was able to toss aside the "strategic competitor" rhetoric and move to cooperate with the PRC in the war on terrorism. Even while maintaining a balance among domestic factions in how to handle cooperation with the US in the war on terrorism, the PRC used the war on terrorism to advance the bilateral relationship. The prominence of the Taiwan issue and other contested issues not tied to the war on terrorism diminished as the war on terrorism emerged as an important issue in the PRC-US relationship. Even as Bush argued that a blind eye would not be turned toward PRC human rights abuses, such issues nevertheless fell in priority. The sum effect was that the PRC-US relationship reached a new high point, not really comparable with anything in the post-Tiananmen relationship. The convergence of not only economic but now security interests as well offered an entirely new venue for cooperation.
However, it would be premature to conclude based on that alone that the roller coaster relationship of the 1990s - plunging and rising on events - has come to an end. The 1990s saw ups and downs followed by more ups and downs in the PRC-US relationship. Yet the relationship has so far been more stable than before. As we approach almost two years after September 11, there has been no major decline in the state of PRC-US relations. This is significant as the period contained significant differences in major issues such as weapon sales to Taiwan and the war on Iraq.
These issues do not equate with the major falls of Tiananmen, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the embassy bombing, and the EP-3E incident. The irritants in the relationship after September 11 have been the ever-present ones like arms sales to Taiwan and criticism of human rights practices, which both sides have long grown accustomed to dealing with without straining the relationship in a major way. As for Iraq, the interests of the PRC were served with France and Russia leading the charge, so the PRC was able to sit in the back and avoid directly confronting the US. The PRC has not faced the hostility France has, even though its position was much the same. In any case, if France and Russia had jumped to the US side, the PRC would not have been inclined to stand alone against Washington in the UNSC.
Nevertheless, there is an underlying distrust that continues in the PRC-US relationship.109 Traditional domestic politics in both countries also continues to pull the PRC-US relationship in different direction. Nationalists, conservatives and the military are the traditional voices of anti-US sentiment in the PRC and they remain strong. Their influence can be seen in such places as the dispersion of various PRC surveillance to gather intelligence on the US war in Iraq to look for potential weaknesses. Nationalists continue to chafe against US "hegemony," forwarded by things like the Bush security doctrine, in which the US "has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge."110
The same can be seen in the US. Traditional human rights questions emanate from the left. On the right, the neoconservatives who are so influential in the administration continue to hold the PRC as a key long-term threat to the US. In a recent article in the Weekly Standard, Gary Schmitt wrote:
Whatever moderation China is exhibiting on the diplomatic front, it continues headlong in its effort to undermine America's security guarantees in the region. ... The truth is that the United States can put off competition with China only so long. At the end of the day, China's ambitions make a contest inevitable. For that reason, the United States should be taking advantage of China's current preoccupation with its internal affairs to strengthen our hand in the region. Washington should so conduct relations as to leave no room for the Chinese to doubt that the United States is able and willing to turn aside any challenge they pose.111
As long as such thinking plays an important part in the US administration or even in US politics, there is a strong possibility that policy toward the PRC will be confrontational, placing stress on the bilateral relationship and making a pattern like in the 1990s a possibility as well.
Thanks to new areas of cooperation and an attitude shift, a more stable relationship has emerged in the wake of September 11 between the PRC and the US. Good will was developed through concrete cooperation rather than the diplomatic fluff that typically is used to bolster the relationship. It is true that the relationship was on an upswing after the EP-3E incident as both countries sought to pull back but there is no reason to think that this was any different than the previous upswings after any of the other low points in the relationship. September 11 brought the relationship new levels of cooperation. But this has yet to be truly tested. The relationship navigated successfully around difference on arms sales to Taiwan and the war on Iraq, but no major strain on the relationship has yet to truly test the hypothesis that the PRC-US relationship has moved beyond the roller coaster of the 1990s.
Japan's new military roles emerged in the context of a PRC-US relationship bolstered by this new strength in the relationship. The US has long pushed Japan to move away from its pacifist constitution and the war on terrorism was a great opportunity for the US to further this. Domestically in Japan, there has been growing elite support in Japan for this for a while, with Koizumi among its leading supporters. Professor Tomihisa Sakamoto, a defense analyst at Aoyama Gakuin University, said: "Koizumi is very keen to have Japan play a significant role on the side of the Americans in the ongoing conflict." Finally, The post-September 11 PRC-US relationship meant that the PRC would not breathe fire about Japan's new military role.
The CCP uses the memory of Japan's war against China - and their prominent position of opposition - to add legitimacy for their own rule.112 Nevertheless, the voices of caution in "friendly tones" used in the PRC's mild response to Japanese use of the SDF in the war on terrorism belies their tacit acceptance of not only Japan's role in the war on terrorism but on Japan's eventual loosening of the rules for sending military forces abroad.113 The PRC made clear its anxieties about latent Japanese militarism remain, but showed that under the right circumstances it would accept greater military activity for Japan.
Japan used the war on terrorism to set a range of military precedents. They provided support for actual combat operations as opposed to peacekeeping operations. Highly relevant to the Taiwan issue, they showed that the Guidelines' "areas surrounding Japan" could be interpreted to mean the Indian Ocean, confirming PRC suspicions that Taiwan was also within that area. Japan SDF assisted the US, but importantly they also helped non-US ships participating in the operation in Afghanistan. In short, Japan used its cooperation on the war in terrorism to push through major advances in the effort of some of its leaders to make Japan a "normal" nation once again.
The war on terrorism has provided for significant shifts in the trilateral relationship that have been on the whole positive. Most notably, the cooperation has contributed to a stability in the relationship that, although untested, may have fundamentally altered the PRC-US relationship. Japan's continuing moves to become a normal nation were forwarded by its activities in the war on terrorism with the encouragement and qualified acceptance of the PRC. Japan's strong support continued through the war on terrorism to other issues such as Iraq, while the PRC carefully hedged from the beginning against future US moves and it's qualified support for the war on terrorism was not extended to the war on Iraq.
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Table of Contents | 1. Introduction: Theory and Methodology | 2. The Taiwan Strait Crisis | 3. The Senkaku Islands Crisis | 4. The EP-3E Incident | 5. The War on Terrorism | 6. The PRC in the US-Japan Relationship
List of Acronyms | Bibliography
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